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T
he operations of U.S. government agencies in foreign exchange markets
are probably regarded as arcane by most Americans. These operations
are, however, an important element of U.S. international economic pol-
icy. And from time to time they are highly visible to the public: for example,
when the United States and other major industrial countries intervene jointly
in the markets to inﬂuence exchange rates, or when they provide assistance to
particular countries such as the substantial aid extended to Mexico in 1995.
The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 gives the Treasury primary responsibility for
United States foreign exchange operations through its Exchange Stabilization
Fund (ESF). Although the Federal Reserve (Fed) had been active in foreign
exchange markets in the 1920s and early 1930s, its involvement ceased after
1934.1 There was relatively little need for ofﬁcial U.S. foreign exchange
operations in the early post-World War II period. Under the Bretton Woods
arrangements of 1944, foreign governments assumed responsibility for ﬁxing
the value of their currencies against the dollar. For its part, the United States
managed its monetary policy in accordance with the Gold Reserve Act so as
to maintain the dollar’s convertibility into gold at $35 an ounce.
U.S. authorities, however, were reluctant to pursue sufﬁciently tight mone-
tary policy to protect the country’s gold reserves following the resumption of
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full convertibility among the major currencies in the late 1950s. And the Fed
resumed foreign exchange operations in 1962, after a nearly 30-year hiatus,
to supplement and substitute for monetary tightening in defense of the dollar.
Although the Fed has consistently held that it has independent authority to
undertake foreign exchange operations, in practice the Fed works closely with
the Treasury in conducting them. Indeed, the Federal Open Market Committee’s
(FOMC’s) foreign currency directive requires that these operations be con-
ducted “in close and continuous consultation and cooperation with the United
States Treasury.”2 So it seems fair to say that the Fed recognizes the Treasury’s
preeminence in foreign exchange policy.
The Treasury welcomed the Fed’s renewed participation in large part be-
cause the Fed brought with it resources to supplement those of the ESF. In
1962 the Fed established reciprocal currency agreements—commonly called
“swaps”—with nine central banks and the Bank for International Settlements.
Further, in 1963, the Fed agreed to “warehouse” foreign currencies held by the
ESF. The primary objective of these initiatives was to provide U.S. authorities
with a supply of foreign currencies to buy back dollars in order to help protect
U.S. gold reserves.3
FOMC discussions at the time made it clear that some Fed ofﬁcials recog-
nized how following the Treasury’s lead in foreign exchange operations could
compromise the Fed’s independence in conducting monetary policy.4 This risk
did not present serious operational problems at the time, however, because the
United States was committed to the Bretton Woods arrangements and monetary
policy was committed to defending the dollar.5 Thus, the Fed and the Treasury
were working toward the same general objectives, and the Fed’s independence
was not a pressing issue in practice.
We argue below that subsequent developments have undermined the favor-
able conditions that enabled the Fed to participate in foreign exchange oper-
ations without compromising either its independence or its monetary policy
goals. We make our case by developing several preliminary points. In Section
1 we explain how theoretical advances and practical experience in recent years
teach that the Fed’s longer-term low-inﬂation objective must be credible if
the Fed is to pursue this objective efﬁciently via monetary policy. Moreover,
the Fed’s independence is the cornerstone of this credibility. In Section 2 we
explain why Fed credibility based on independence is inherently fragile, and we
2 See the discussion in Humpage (1994), pp. 3–4.
3 Pauls (1990) details the evolution of U.S. exchange rate policy in the post-World War II
period.
4 See Hetzel (1996).
5 That either a ﬁxed exchange rate or a ﬁxed gold price commitment requires monetary
policy to be dedicated to that objective is emphasized, for example, by McCallum (1996b),
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emphasize the crucial importance of the Fed’s off-budget status in supporting
its independence.
We take up the role of the Fed in foreign exchange operations in Section 3,
where we distinguish two broad types of ofﬁcial foreign exchange transactions:
unsterilized and sterilized. As explained there, unsterilized transactions are es-
sentially monetary policy actions and therefore are carried out independently
by the Federal Reserve. Since sterilized transactions are not monetary policy
actions, the Fed can acknowledge the Treasury’s leadership regarding them
without directly compromising its independence.
Evidence accumulated over the past two decades suggests, however, that
sterilized intervention in exchange markets has at best only temporary effects on
exchange rates and must be supported by monetary policy actions to have last-
ing effects. Consequently, the Fed’s participation with the Treasury in sterilized
operations creates confusion as to whether monetary policy is dedicated to the
support of exchange rate or domestic objectives. Such confusion weakens the
public’s perception of the Fed’s independence and undermines the credibility
of the Fed’s low-inﬂation goal.
In Section 4 we lay out in more detail the inherent contradictions for mon-
etary policy that arise when the Fed follows the Treasury’s lead on exchange
rate policy. And we argue in Section 5 that the Fed’s ﬁnancing of even sterilized
foreign exchange operations constitutes a misuse of the Fed’s off-budget
status that risks undermining the public’s acceptance of the independence of
the Fed. We believe that the best way to resolve the conﬂict between foreign
exchange operations and monetary policy is for the Fed to disengage from
foreign exchange operations completely. The concluding section summarizes
our argument.
1. CREDIBILITY AND THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF MONETARY POLICY
Numerous disinﬂations since the early 1980s have taught central bankers around
the world that credibility—having a reputation for pursuing price level stabil-
ity consistently and persistently—is the key to an effective anti-inﬂationary
monetary policy.6 We would even go so far as to say that the primary policy
problem facing the Fed during this period has been the acquisition and main-
tenance of credibility for its commitment to low inﬂation—so much so that
credibility concerns remain a motivating or restraining inﬂuence on monetary
policy actions today, even though the Federal Reserve’s low-inﬂation objective
has nearly been achieved.
6 See the accounts in Leiderman and Svensson (1995).4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
As it happens, the growing practical appreciation of the importance of
credibility is supported by an improved scientiﬁc understanding associated with
game theory and the rational expectations approach to monetary theory. In many
ways, theory simply articulates what central bankers have learned from prac-
tical experience. Brieﬂy, the theory recognizes that monetary policy involves
continuous interaction between a central bank and the public that introduces
a link, in the public’s mind, between current policy and future policy actions.
In the absence of credibility, expansionary current monetary policy tends to
generate expectations of expansionary policy—and possibly excessively expan-
sionary policy—in the future. Such expectations trigger aggressive wage and
price increases that, in turn, neutralize the beneﬁcial effects of the expansionary
current policy. The result is higher inﬂation with little, if any, sustained increase
in employment and output.
Theory supports the idea that the potential for future inﬂation, which can be
thought of as a punishment imposed collectively by wage- and price-setters on a
central bank, can discipline a central bank. In a reputational equilibrium, wage-
and price-setters keep their part of an implicit bargain by not inﬂating as long
as the central bank demonstrates its commitment to low inﬂation by eschewing
excessively easy policy. A central bank may be said to have credibility when an
implicit mutual understanding between the public and the central bank sustains
a low-inﬂation equilibrium.7
The key point is that a low-inﬂation equilibrium sustained by central bank
credibility is fragile. In such an equilibrium the public is very sensitive to any
central bank departure from the behavior it has come to anticipate; this expected
continued behavior, indeed, is the essence of the central bank’s credibility. The
public is particularly nervous about such departures when the central bank
has acquired credibility only recently. But there is evidence that low-inﬂation
equilibria sustained by credibility continue to be fragile even when a central
bank’s actions have repeatedly demonstrated its commitment to low inﬂation
over a period of years.
The fragility of the Fed’s credibility is evident in the behavior of long-term
bond rates.8 The real yield on the 30-year U.S. government bond probably
moves within a range of 2 percentage points or so around 3 percent per year.9
The remainder of the nominal long-term yield reﬂects inﬂation expectations. In
the early 1960s, for example, when inﬂation averaged between 1 and 2 percent
7 The introductory chapter in Persson and Tabellini (1994) contains a good survey of
research on the role of credibility in monetary and ﬁscal policy. Barro and Gordon (1983),
Cukierman (1992), and Sargent (1986) contain seminal analyses of credibility.
8 Goodfriend (1993) and King (1995), for example, interpret movements in long-term bond
rates as indicators of credibility for low inﬂation.
9 Ireland’s (1996) study of the ten-year bond rate provides some support for this view.Alfred Broaddus, Marvin Goodfriend: Foreign Exchange Operations 5
per year, the 30-year bond yielded roughly 4 percent.10 In 1981, when the
public’s conﬁdence in the Fed’s commitment to controlling inﬂation was at its
low point, the long-term bond yield reached nearly 15 percent. The rate stood
at around 6 percent in late 1995, which indicated that the public expected about
3 percent inﬂation on average over the long term.
Doubts about a central bank’s credibility often surface as “inﬂation scares”
in the long-term bond market. Following a period of rising inﬂation in the
late 1970s, for example, the 30-year rate jumped 2 percentage points in the
ﬁrst quarter of 1980, which signaled the most serious and sudden collapse
of conﬁdence in the Fed on record. The fragility of the Fed’s credibility was
apparent again in 1984 when the bond rate, after falling to about 10 percent in
late 1982, registered another inﬂation scare by rising to around 13.5 percent,
even though the Fed had by then brought actual inﬂation down from over 10
percent to around 4 percent.
The swings in the bond rate over the past two years have been less dramatic
than in the early 1980s, but nonetheless substantial. Rising from a low of about
5.8 percent in October 1993, the bond rate peaked at around 8.2 percent in
November 1994. We interpret that wide swing as evidence that the Fed’s anti-
inﬂationary credibility remains exceedingly brittle despite years of sustained
progress in bringing the actual inﬂation rate down.
The fragile nature of the Fed’s credibility imposes a number of costs on the
economy. First, there is the direct cost of higher long-term interest rates with
their negative effects on economic performance. Second, with inﬂation expec-
tations higher than they should be, the Fed is left with the difﬁcult choice of
either accommodating these expectations and accepting higher rates of inﬂation
or failing to accommodate them and risking negative short-term effects on real
economic activity. Moreover, even hesitating to react can be costly because, by
suggesting indifference, the Fed may encourage workers and ﬁrms to ask for
wage and price increases to protect themselves from higher expected costs.
Finally—a related point—weak credibility makes it difﬁcult for the Fed to
respond when employment considerations call for an easing of policy, as they
did in the 1990–91 recession and again in mid-1995. In such circumstances,
the Fed must balance the desirable short-term effects of lower short-term rates
against the risk of higher long-term rates.
2. FEDERAL RESERVE INDEPENDENCE
A number of prominent institutional mechanisms have been used to assist cen-
tral banks in maintaining credibility for low-inﬂation objectives. Historically,
a national commitment to a gold or silver standard—that is, a commitment to
maintain a ﬁxed currency price of gold or silver—was the most important. A
10 See Salomon Brothers and Hutzler (1968).6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
second mechanism, more prominent in recent years, is for a country to commit
to ﬁx its exchange rate against the currency of a trading partner that credibly
maintains the purchasing power of its currency. An important motivation for
the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS), for example, was
the desire of some countries to import credibility for low inﬂation by pegging
their currencies to the deutsche mark (D-mark). Difﬁculties with ﬁxing ex-
change rates, including the near collapse of the EMS in the early 1990s, have
led some countries to experiment recently with a third commitment device:
inﬂation targets.11 Finally, countries have relied on central bank independence
to supplement one of the other mechanisms or to substitute for them.
Broadly speaking, central bank independence implies a separation of bank
decisions from the regular decisions of the political system.12 At a minimum,
it means that a central bank is free to conduct monetary policy without inter-
ference from the Treasury. The degree of actual operational freedom enjoyed
by an independent central bank, however, has varied widely depending on the
circumstances. For instance, in the nineteenth century, when wide support for
central bank independence ﬁrst developed, independent central banks were nar-
rowly constrained by national commitments to various commodity standards.
Similarly, the Federal Reserve was established in 1913 as an independent central
bank mandated by the Federal Reserve Act to stabilize ﬁnancial markets while
keeping the United States on the gold standard.
A central bank may be said to lack “goal independence” when its objective
is given by legislative mandate; however, one can still speak of a central bank
as having “instrument independence”—the freedom to use a short-term interest
rate or other monetary policy instrument to achieve its mandated goals.13 The
Fed has had full instrument independence, except for the World War II years and
the period from the end of the war to the 1951 Fed-Treasury Accord. During
that time the Fed was obliged to maintain low interest rates on government
securities to facilitate the Treasury’s ﬁnances. The Accord reasserted the prin-
ciple that monetary policy should be used for macroeconomic stabilization,
the ﬁscal concerns of the Treasury notwithstanding. In terms of the above
deﬁnitions, the Accord fully restored the Fed’s instrument independence.14
The Accord did not give the Fed goal independence because monetary
policy was still committed under the Bretton Woods arrangements to support
the ﬁxed dollar price of gold. When the Bretton Woods System collapsed
11 Leiderman and Svensson (1995) and McCallum (1996a) contain accounts of the experi-
ence with inﬂation targets in a number of countries. For an empirical study of exchange rate
credibility in the EMS, see Rose and Svensson (1994).
12 This deﬁnition is from Hetzel (1990), p. 165.
13 Fischer (1994), p. 292, distinguishes between goal and instrument independence.
14 The Fed actually abandoned its short-term interest rate peg in 1947; it gave up its long-
term rate peg in 1951. Stein (1969) contains a good discussion of developments leading up to the
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in 1973, however, the national consensus on the proper goal for monetary
policy collapsed with it, and the Fed has been operating without an explicit
congressional mandate since then.15 Thus, during this period the Fed has had
goal independence by default, as it were, and this independence is now arguably
the sole institutional mechanism supporting low inﬂation in the United States.
Independence and Credibility
A goal-independent Fed unrestrained by a legislative mandate is a particularly
deﬁcient mechanism for maintaining low inﬂation. The reason is that in this
situation a low-inﬂation equilibrium must be supported entirely by credibility
that the Fed creates for itself—credibility that is inherently fragile as discussed
above. The unbridled discretion conferred on the Fed in this case only makes
the acquisition and maintenance of credibility for low inﬂation more difﬁcult.
The Fed’s goal independence gives other government entities strong incentives
to attempt to inﬂuence its policies via such channels as congressional oversight
hearings, appointments of Federal Reserve governors, proposed changes in the
Fed’s regulatory role, and so forth. Moreover, such attempts at inﬂuence can
be of a conﬂicting nature, adding to the confusion. Knowing this, the public is
rightly suspicious of any potential conﬂict between the Fed, the Treasury, and
Congress. In this environment, any contact that Fed ofﬁcials have with the rest
of the government risks creating credibility problems for monetary policy.
At the same time—and paradoxically—central bank goal independence
actually creates incentives for Fed ofﬁcials to interact with the rest of the
government.16 The lack of clarity in the Fed’s mandate necessitates deeper
involvement in the legislative process by Fed ofﬁcials who must see to it that
proposed legislation does not compromise its monetary policy mission. Finally,
the Fed’s independence confers upon it a nonpartisan aura which leads others
in government to seek its advice, certiﬁcation, or arbitration in controversial
policy disputes.
Financial Independence
In principle, a healthy democracy requires full public discussion of expenditures
of public monies. The congressional appropriations process enables Congress
to evaluate competing budgetary programs and to establish priorities for the
allocation of public resources.
Congress has long recognized, however, that the pressure of budgetary
politics could tempt future Congresses to press the Fed at least implicitly to
15 It is true that the 1978 Humphrey-Hawkins law mandates the Fed to set monetary
aggregate targets as guides to short-run policy. But the Humphrey-Hawkins law instructs the
Fed to take account of so many potentially conﬂicting macroeconomic concerns in setting the
targets that it has exercised little restraint on the Fed’s freedom of action.
16 See Bradsher (1995).8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
help ﬁnance federal expenditures through inﬂationary monetary policy. Con-
sequently, the Fed has been made ﬁnancially independent—its operations are
funded from the interest payments on its portfolio of securities—and the Fed
has wide discretion over the assets it holds. In short, the Fed is exempt from
the congressional appropriations process in order to keep the political system
from exploiting inﬂationary money creation. It is critically important that the
Fed not misuse this exceptional “off-budget” status so as not to undermine
public understanding of and support for its ﬁnancial independence. This, in
turn, requires the Fed to understand clearly what activities are and are not
essential to its central banking mission.
3. THE ROLE OF THE FED IN FOREIGN
EXCHANGE OPERATIONS
The points about credibility and independence developed above will serve as
the basis for our assessment of the Fed’s role in foreign exchange operations
in what follows. Here we review the basic mechanics of foreign exchange
operations. We begin by making the important distinction between unsterilized
and sterilized transactions. Then we brieﬂy discuss the means by which the
Fed ﬁnances foreign exchange operations for its own account and warehouses
foreign exchange for the ESF.17 Our analysis identiﬁes in a preliminary way
the fundamental sources of conﬂict for monetary policy arising from the Fed’s
participation in foreign exchange operations.
Unsterilized and Sterilized Operations
The distinction between unsterilized and sterilized operations is straightforward:
unsterilized transactions involve changes in the monetary base, and sterilized
transactions do not. For example, the Fed could acquire foreign exchange in an
unsterilized purchase using newly created base money: that is, bank reserves or
currency. Such a transaction would be an expansionary monetary policy action
because it would increase the monetary base.
A foreign exchange purchase would be sterilized, in contrast, if the Fed off-
set its effect on the base by selling an equivalent amount of dollar-denominated
securities. Because the Fed controls the monetary base, it is in a position to
determine whether a foreign exchange operation is sterilized or not. In practice,
the Fed routinely sterilizes foreign exchange operations that it undertakes for its
own account and for the ESF. In sterilized operations the current federal funds
rate target (the key policy instrument indicating the current stance of monetary
17 A detailed description of the mechanics of foreign exchange operations using T-accounts
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policy) is maintained. This point is important because it implies that—at least
as a mechanical matter—the Fed can follow the Treasury’s lead in sterilized
foreign exchange operations without relinquishing control of monetary policy.
Nevertheless, sterilized foreign exchange operations, or “intervention,”
pose signiﬁcant problems for the Fed. For the most part, economists agree
that sterilized intervention by central banks in foreign exchange markets has
no lasting effect on exchange rates.18 In the absence of supporting monetary
policy actions, sterilized interventions can inﬂuence exchange rates temporarily,
especially when the interventions are unexpected. But obviously the ability of
authorities to surprise markets is very limited. Sterilized intervention can be
most effective when it signals a government’s resolve to follow up with mon-
etary or ﬁscal policy actions that will powerfully inﬂuence the exchange rate
in the future.19 Consequently, Fed participation in sterilized foreign exchange
operations under the Treasury’s leadership creates confusion as to whether
monetary policy will support short-term exchange rate objectives or longer-
term anti-inﬂationary objectives. Only occasionally will the monetary policy
actions required to pursue these two objectives coincide.
This confusion is compounded by a lack of consistency in U.S. exchange
rate policy in the post-1973 ﬂoating exchange rate regime. Ofﬁcially, the objec-
tive of foreign exchange operations is to counter “disorderly market conditions,”
but that phrase has never been deﬁned operationally. It was interpreted most
narrowly in the ﬁrst Reagan administration, when U.S. operations were mini-
mal. It was interpreted broadly between 1977 and 1979 when the dollar was
viewed as unacceptably low and again in 1985 when the dollar was unaccept-
ably high. Intervention was undertaken in these periods to help push the dollar
into an acceptable range. Extensive interventions were carried out in the years
following the Louvre Accord of 1987 to help stabilize the exchange rate.20
Moreover, much U.S. intervention in recent years has been coordinated with
foreign governments. The Group of Seven ﬁnance ministers and central bank
governors meet regularly to discuss exchange rate objectives. The enormous
publicity surrounding these discussions, designed to underscore international
harmony on exchange rate policy, heightens uncertainty regarding whether the
Fed will support sterilized operations with monetary policy actions. The wide-
spread coverage of internationally “coordinated” foreign exchange operations
is almost certainly harmful to the public’s perception of the Fed’s independence
and thereby weakens the credibility of the Fed’s low-inﬂation strategy.
18 A representative survey of the academic literature on this point would include Bordo and
Schwartz (1991), Edison (1993), and Obstfeld (1990), and references contained therein.
19 See Mussa (1981).
20 See Destler and Henning (1989), Funabashi (1989), and Pauls (1990) for discussions of
U.S. exchange rate policy.10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Financing Mechanisms
Federal Reserve acquisitions of foreign exchange are generally ﬁnanced in one
of three ways. If the FOMC approves, the Fed can acquire foreign exchange for
its own account by creating additional bank reserves or currency—that is, via an
unsterilized transaction. Sterilized acquisitions, on the other hand, are ﬁnanced
by selling Treasury securities from the Fed’s portfolio. Finally, the Fed has
the option of borrowing currencies from foreign central banks using reciprocal
currency agreements—the so-called “swap” network. Swap facilities are, in
effect, short-term lines of credit giving central banks access to one another’s
currencies. The facilities provide for the swap (simultaneous spot purchase and
forward sale) of each other’s currency by the Fed and the foreign central bank.
Swaps typically are not accompanied by any change in monetary policy—in
other words they are sterilized transactions.21 The Fed holds foreign exchange
in the form of short-term securities or interest-bearing deposits at foreign central
banks, so that sterilized transactions amount to substituting foreign-currency-
denominated interest-earning assets for dollar-denominated securities in the
Fed’s portfolio.
The Fed bears the exchange rate revaluation risk—as well as the credit
risk—for any foreign-currency-denominated assets it holds for its own account.
Since the Fed marks its foreign currency assets to market monthly, a depre-
ciation of the foreign exchange value of the dollar, for instance, raises the
dollar value of the Fed’s foreign holdings. Any such gains or losses eventually
show up as larger or smaller Fed payments to the Treasury after expenses.22
Whenever the Fed disperses foreign exchange acquired through a swap, it
bears the exchange risk involved in covering its forward commitment to reverse
the swap.
The Exchange Stabilization Fund
As mentioned above, the Treasury conducts foreign exchange operations
through its Exchange Stabilization Fund. When it was established by the Gold
Reserve Act, the ESF was capitalized with $2 billion derived from the proceeds
of the 1934 revaluation of the U.S. gold stock from $20.67 to $35 per ounce.
Later, $1.8 billion was transferred from the ESF as partial payment on the
U.S. subscription to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which left $200
million as the remaining capital of the ESF. ESF capital has grown since then
21 The Fed drew on its swap lines in the 1960s to protect the Treasury’s gold stock by using
the borrowed currencies to buy back dollar reserves from foreign central banks. These transactions
effectively allowed the United States to assume a portion of other countries’ devaluation risk.
More recently, the United States has had sufﬁcient foreign currency reserves and has not drawn
on its swap lines.
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as a result of retained interest earnings, revaluations of gold, and proﬁts on
foreign exchange acquisitions.23
Since use of its funds is not subject to the appropriations process, the
ESF provides the Treasury with a degree of ﬂexibility and discretion in its
foreign exchange operations. The ESF serves two broad purposes. First, it is
used to intervene in foreign exchange markets to inﬂuence dollar exchange
rates with major currencies such as the D-mark and the Japanese Yen. Second,
the ESF makes loans to foreign governments—frequently to heavily indebted
governments and often in association with IMF or other ofﬁcial assistance
programs. Typically such loans are made to deal with a serious balance-of-
payments problem or to assist a country managing its external debt. Often the
currencies of recipient countries are not fully convertible or are of secondary
importance.24 The recent loans to Mexico are a prominent example of this type
of assistance.
The ESF’s capacity for purchasing foreign currencies is limited, however,
as it has not received an appropriation from Congress since 1934. Apart from
the retained earnings on its investments mentioned above, the ESF has been
able to augment the resources at its disposal in three signiﬁcant ways. First,
Congress has authorized advancing to the ESF foreign currencies borrowed
from the IMF. Second, the ESF receives the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)
allocated to the United States by the IMF.25 Third, the Fed has provided the
ESF with additional resources, either by helping to ﬁnance operations on its
own account or by warehousing foreign exchange for the ESF. It was because
the ESF’s resources were limited that the Treasury encouraged the Fed in the
early 1960s to participate for its own account in foreign currency operations
and to warehouse foreign currencies. In 1990, the dollar value of U.S. net
foreign currency balances (the sum of acquisitions on the Fed’s and the ESF’s
accounts) exceeded $40 billion.26 The FOMC authorized warehousing of ESF
foreign currencies up to a limit of $15 billion in 1990.
Warehousing allows the ESF to ﬁnance purchases of foreign exchange
in much the same way that securities dealers use repurchase agreements with
banks to ﬁnance their portfolios. That is, warehousing allows the ESF to enlarge
its portfolio of foreign-currency-denominated assets with funds borrowed from
the Fed. Suppose, for example, that the ESF wishes to sell dollars for foreign
exchange to depreciate the dollar but has inadequate resources to do so. The
Fed can execute the transaction—warehouse the foreign exchange—by selling
a Treasury security from its portfolio in the open market and using the proceeds
23 U.S. Congress (1976), pp. 3–5.
24 See U.S. Department of the Treasury (1991). U.S. Congress (1976) details ESF operations
from 1968 to 1975. Todd (1992) presents a history of the ESF.
25 SDRs are monetized by transferring them to the Fed.
26 See Pauls (1990), pp. 894 and 904, and U.S. Congress (1976), pp. 3–5.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
to acquire the foreign-currency-denominated securities on behalf of the ESF.
Because the Fed executes the purchase of foreign exchange on behalf of the
ESF, the latter remains exposed to the revaluation gains or losses on the foreign
exchange warehoused. Interest earnings on the foreign currencies warehoused
accrue to the Fed. Note that the warehousing operation amounts to a sterilized
acquisition of foreign exchange.
Whether or not the Fed ﬁnances sterilized foreign exchange purchases
for its own account, or warehouses foreign currencies for the ESF, a sale of
Treasury securities to the public is the ultimate source of the funds. True, the
securities involved are not newly issued; they are sold from the Fed’s portfo-
lio. The results, however, are equivalent in many ways to those of a new issue
since the Fed simply returns to the Treasury all of the interest it receives on the
Treasury securities that it holds, minus a small fraction that covers the Fed’s
operating expenses. The main difference between Fed ﬁnancing and ﬁnancing
by the Treasury itself is that the former is arranged between Treasury and Fed
ofﬁcials without an explicit appropriation from Congress. A second difference
is that Fed ﬁnancing does not show up as a measured increase in the federal
deﬁcit, since it does not involve newly issued debt.
Although the Fed is the junior partner with the Treasury on foreign ex-
change policy, it is certainly an equal partner in terms of the resources provided.
It is able to make these resources readily available without a congressional ap-
propriation because its ﬁnancial independence puts its open market operations
in Treasury securities off-budget. The exchange operations arranged by the
Treasury, however, not infrequently involve broader foreign relationships in
ways that may be politically charged. Hence, the Fed’s involvement, especially
because it is outside the formal budget process, puts public support for its
ﬁnancial independence at risk, and with it, the credibility of its low-inﬂation
policy.
4. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN EXCHANGE RATE
POLICY AND MONETARY POLICY
The national commitment to the Bretton Woods arrangements minimized the
risk of policy conﬂict between the Fed and the Treasury when the Fed resumed
its participation in foreign exchange operations in the early 1960s. But the
nation’s unwillingness to support that commitment with sufﬁciently restrictive
monetary policy led to the collapse of the ﬁxed exchange rate system in 1973.
Several years of sharply rising inﬂation followed. Despite this, Congress was
unable to reach consensus on a new monetary policy mandate. Consequently,
in 1979 the Fed asserted its own commitment to restore low inﬂation.
We believe that these developments have undermined the Fed’s ability to
participate in exchange rate policy without compromising its independence andAlfred Broaddus, Marvin Goodfriend: Foreign Exchange Operations 13
its monetary policy goals. In particular, with the potential for Fed-Treasury
policy conﬂicts now signiﬁcantly enlarged, it is no longer possible for the Fed
simply to follow the Treasury’s lead on exchange rate policy without endan-
gering its monetary policy credibility. This is true even in the case of sterilized
interventions. Under the current arrangement, the Fed participates in sterilized
operations without committing to support the operations with future monetary
policy actions. This maintains the Fed’s independence by keeping its options
open. But such discretion increases the likelihood that particular operations
may fail because the Fed is not willing to support them with monetary policy.
Failed foreign exchange operations are costly because they give the impres-
sion that the authorities are either unable or unwilling to achieve a prominent
objective that they appear to be pursuing. For example, the failure of the June
24, 1994, intervention was reported in a front-page New York Times story car-
rying the headline: “16 Central Banks are Thwarted in Huge Effort to Prop
Up Dollar.”27 Nor was attention to the event conﬁned to major money centers.
On the following day the Richmond Times-Dispatch reported the story with the
front-page headline: “Effort to Bolster Dollar a Failure.” Widely publicized pol-
icy failures undermine Fed credibility and thereby jeopardize the effectiveness
of overall monetary policy.
We believe that, to best protect the credibility of its low-inﬂation goal
and the independence of monetary policy more generally, the Fed should be
separated completely from the Treasury’s foreign exchange operations. In prin-
ciple, the Fed could disengage unilaterally; however, there would be two major
practical obstacles to such an action. The most serious obstacle is that the
appointment process would make it difﬁcult for the Fed to bind itself not to
participate, since appointments to the Federal Reserve Board could be made on
condition of cooperation with the Treasury. Congress might be able to block
such conditions in the conﬁrmation process in particular cases if it were so
disposed, but legislation probably would be required to remove the Fed from
exchange market intervention deﬁnitively.
The second main obstacle to unilateral disengagement is that it would
deny the Treasury the beneﬁt of the Fed’s advice on foreign exchange inter-
vention and the certiﬁcation that goes with it. Here, though, the Fed cannot
be indifferent to the use of its name in headlines that either box it in or harm
its credibility. Moreover, the act of certiﬁcation itself creates a perception of
partisanship that erodes the value of that certiﬁcation, even as it undermines
the public’s perception of the Fed’s independence.
In these circumstances, it is natural to look for a middle-of-the-road solu-
tion to the problems presented by the Fed’s involvement in exchange market
operations. One might, for example, try to specify particular circumstances in
27 See Friedman (1994).14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
which the Fed could participate. For instance, if the Fed routinely announced an
inﬂation target, it could agree to help the Treasury intervene if the inﬂation rate
were within a speciﬁed range of the target. Deﬁning such conditions clearly,
however, would be difﬁcult, and this approach would leave the door open to
many of the same problems the Fed faces currently.
5. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FOREIGN
EXCHANGE OPERATIONS AND
THE FED’S FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE
From the start, a major reason for the resumption of Federal Reserve for-
eign exchange operations in the 1960s was to make Fed resources available
to the ESF. The Fed’s ﬁnancial independence gave it the discretion to allocate
resources to foreign exchange operations without an explicit congressional ap-
propriation. Apparently there was then little concern about misuse of the Fed’s
off-budget status because Fed ﬁnancing of foreign exchange operations at the
time seemed conformable with the nation’s commitment to the Bretton Woods
system. Such ﬁnancing has become more problematic with the breakdown of
the national consensus on monetary and exchange rate policy in the aftermath
of the collapse of Bretton Woods.
Economists understand more clearly today than they did in the 1960s the
distinction between Federal Reserve monetary policy and credit policy.28 As
pointed out in Section 3, sterilized foreign exchange operations are not mon-
etary policy since they leave the monetary base and the federal funds interest
rate target unchanged. Such operations do, however, constitute credit policy
since they amount to a substitution of loans to foreign authorities for dollar-
denominated securities in the Fed’s portfolio. In effect, sterilized operations are
extensions of Fed credit ﬁnanced by selling Treasury debt from the Fed’s port-
folio. Such extensions of credit are clearly ﬁscal policy, not monetary policy.
The extension of credit by U.S. authorities involves both market and credit
risk. Although the default or credit risk of the securities in which major for-
eign currency balances are held is negligible, the revaluation or market risk
is considerable. Credit risk, however, can also be substantial when a loan is
made to assist, say, a country managing its external debt or one with a serious
balance-of-payments problem. Provisions can be made to take collateral if the
borrowing country proves unable to make scheduled payments. But such provi-
sions are not always feasible or entirely effective. When a borrowing country’s
ﬁnancial problems prove persistent, the ESF and the Fed can be “taken out” by
longer-term funding arranged through international organizations such as the
28 This distinction is developed in Goodfriend and King (1990) and used in Goodfriend
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IMF.29 But to the extent that collateralization is incomplete or “take outs” are
not arranged in advance or are uncertain, taxpayers are at risk. Thus, in their
foreign exchange operations the Fed and the ESF assume risk—both market
risk and credit risk—on behalf of the U.S. taxpayer.
The national decision to put funds at risk in foreign exchange operations
is clearly an important ﬁscal policy matter. The presumption is that—as with
any ﬁscal action—Congress should authorize the expenditure and explicitly
appropriate the funds. Fed ﬁnancing of foreign exchange operations through
its own account and by warehousing funds for the ESF sidesteps congressional
authorization and obscures the funding.
The Fed’s ﬁnancing of foreign exchange operations without explicit di-
rection from Congress exposes it to potentially harsh criticism if an initiative
goes badly. Unfavorable outcomes would obviously undermine public support
for the Fed’s ﬁnancial independence. But there is a more subtle risk, even
if foreign initiatives funded by the Fed go well. Some will ask whether, if
Fed ﬁnancing of credit extensions to foreigners is beneﬁcial, it might also be
desirable for the Fed to support worthy domestic objectives. Any attempt to
exploit the Fed’s ﬁnancial independence in this manner would almost guarantee
that its independence would be withdrawn over time.
Fed off-budget funding attracted substantial attention in the Mexican case
in 1995, as indicated by a remarkable headline in The New York Times: “Clinton
Offers $20 Billion to Mexico for Peso Rescue; Action Sidesteps Congress.”30
Should the Fed take comfort from the relative absence to date of signiﬁcant
negative repercussions from its involvement in this initiative? We think not.
The publicity for the Mexican rescue put the Fed’s off-budget funding powers
on the radar screen, along with the potential risks described above. The Fed
appeared to receive the implicit support of the congressional leadership in this
instance, but Congress itself probably would not have voted to authorize the
funds, and the public at large did not seem to favor such generous support for
Mexico. Indeed, many Americans, including some prominent ones, viewed the
transaction as a bailout of big investors. If, over time, developments in Mexico
turn unfavorable, the result could be an erosion of public and congressional
support for the Fed’s ﬁnancial independence.
29 To the extent that the funds are provided by the United States in the ﬁrst place, the
possibility of such takeouts amounts to only a partial reduction of U.S. taxpayer risk. On some
occasions when U.S. authorities have drawn and dispersed foreign currencies through the swap
network, the U.S. Treasury has repaid the swap loans with foreign exchange borrowed on a long-
term basis using so-called “Roosa,” or “Carter,” bonds. Such actions, however, only shift the
market risk from short to long term. See U.S. Congress (1976), pp. 4, 5, and 40.
30 See Sanger (1995). Folkerts-Landau and Ito et al. (1995) contains a thorough account of
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In brief, Congress deliberately placed the Fed outside the appropriations
process in order to safeguard its independence. The Fed should not misuse its
off-budget status to ﬁnance initiatives that are unrelated to monetary policy
because there is very little to be gained and much to lose.
6. CONCLUSION
We have assessed the consequences of the Fed’s participation in foreign ex-
change operations. Our analysis was based on the idea that central bank cred-
ibility for low inﬂation is the cornerstone of an effective monetary policy and
that public support for Fed independence is the foundation of that credibility.
Distinguishing between sterilized and unsterilized foreign exchange op-
erations, we recognized that as a mechanical matter the Fed can follow the
Treasury’s lead on sterilized operations without compromising its independence
on monetary policy. There is little evidence, however, that sterilized interven-
tion alone can have a sustained effect on the exchange rate. Thus, the Fed’s
participation in foreign exchange policy with the Treasury creates doubt about
whether monetary policy will support domestic or external objectives, and this
doubt undermines the credibility of the Fed’s longer-term objective of reducing
and ultimately eliminating inﬂation.
Although the Fed is the junior partner with the Treasury on foreign ex-
change operations, it has been an equal partner when it comes to providing the
resources. The Fed can make these resources available without a congressional
appropriation because its ﬁnancial independence puts its open market opera-
tions off-budget. Foreign exchange operations initiated by the Treasury involve
foreign relationships in ways that can be politically charged, especially when
they involve direct loans to foreign governments. We think that Fed ﬁnancing of
such operations risks undermining public respect for its ﬁnancial independence
and with it the credibility of its longer-term price level stability objective.
We argued that central bank independence alone is an inherently frag-
ile basis for the credibility of monetary policy. In view of that fragility, we
recommended that the Fed be separated completely from foreign exchange
operations. We did not argue that the nation should forsake ofﬁcial foreign ex-
change operations—only that the Fed, as an independent central bank, should
not participate. The Treasury would be free to carry out sterilized operations.
Having made this point, we acknowledged that it would be difﬁcult for the
Fed to disengage from foreign exchange operations unilaterally. Consequently,
some sort of congressional legislation would probably be required to remove
the Fed from foreign exchange operations permanently.
In our view, the problems created by the Fed’s involvement in foreign
exchange operations underscore the need for Congress to provide the Fed with
a mandate for price level stability, recognizing a concern for the stabilizationAlfred Broaddus, Marvin Goodfriend: Foreign Exchange Operations 17
of employment and output. Such a mandate would constitute a long over-
due replacement for the commitments made at Bretton Woods.31 Moreover,
ﬁrm congressional support is needed to strengthen the credibility of the Fed’s
anti-inﬂation strategy. By providing an overarching national goal for monetary
policy once again, a price stability mandate would greatly reduce the risk of
conﬂicts and credibility problems when the Fed works closely with the Treasury
and other parts of the government.
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